Corporate governance and public reprimand by Zaini Embong, & Ruhaznawati Md Rudzi,
Asian Journal of Accounting and Governance 8: 165–175 (2017) Special Issue ISSN 2180-3838 
(https://doi.org/10.17576/AJAG-2017-08SI-15)
Corporate Governance and Public Reprimand
ZAINI EMBONG & RUHAZNAWATI MD RUDZI
ABSTRACT
Public reprimand is a form of enforcement actions taken by Bursa Malaysia against companies that violate listing 
requirements, with intention to deter future breach and to cultivate good standards of corporate governance and business 
conduct in the market. Corporate governance is put in place to ensure that companies are managed to the best interest 
of shareholders. Empirical evidences show that corporate governance and enforcement actions are significantly related. 
However, none of the studies are done in Malaysian setting. The nature of capital market and the rules and regulations of 
relevant authority are different from country to country. Hence, it is important to investigate whether enforcement actions 
is also related to corporate governance in Malaysia. When companies were reprimanded, their reputations and most 
often share prices will be affected, compromising the wealth of shareholders. If actions were not taken by the relevant 
authority, confidence in the market may subside and this will affect the development of capital market. The reprimand 
should also serves as educating mechanism in which the affected companies are expected not to repeat the same offence. 
This has yet to be investigated. This study therefore extends existing knowledge on public reprimand by providing empirical 
evidence on Malaysia setting and more importantly whether or not public reprimand serves as educating mechanism. 
This study employs a cross-section, match-pair design with a sample of 110 companies. Results from logistic regression 
indicate that there are significant differences in board characteristics between companies that have been reprimanded 
and those which are not. The test on board characteristics two years after public reprimand however shows that there is 
no significant changes in board characteristics. Small sample size is among limitations of this study. The findings give 
insight on the role of enforcement actions in regulating companies and what need to be done by authority.   
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INTRODUCTION
The main reason companies decide to go public or get 
listed is to raise capital. By being a listed company, the 
company is to raise additional funds through issuance of 
additional stocks on the capital market. This is partly due 
to the fact that listed companies carry with them certain 
reputation due to the criteria that need to be fulfilled 
before they are qualified to be listed. In other words, only 
qualified companies can get listed on the stock exchange, 
hence certain prestige is attached to it. This facilitates 
the company in raising additional capital. Having good 
reputations also lead to ability in securing fund at lower 
cost. In Malaysia, the capital market is managed by 
Bursa Malaysia Berhad that changes its name from Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange in 2004. In 2009, the market 
was restructured from three boards, namely Main, Second 
and MESDAQ (Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing 
and Automated Quotation) market into only Main and 
ACE (Access, Certainty and Efficiency) markets. All 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia are subjected to rules 
and regulations set by Bursa Malaysia Berhad, upon 
admission as well as on a continuing basis. As regulator of 
Malaysian capital market, it is the duty of Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad to maintain a fair and orderly market as well as 
ensure orderly dealings in the securities deposited with 
Bursa Malaysia (www.bursamalaysia.com). The rules and 
regulations, Listing Requirements being one of them are 
set in order to protect investors, ensure transparency and 
maintain high standards of conduct and governance as well 
as market integrity so that market players can participate 
in the market with confidence. In line with this, Bursa 
Malaysia views any breaches to its Business Rules and 
Listing Requirements seriously and enforcement actions 
are taken to protect investors as well as to maintain market 
integrity.
 As part of its duty, Bursa Malaysia makes enquiries 
and investigates potential breaches of rules on annual basis. 
In the process, the potential breaches or violations detected 
might not only be against Bursa’s Listing Requirements, 
but may also be against other relevant laws such as the 
Capital Markets & Services Act 2007 and Companies 
Act 1965 (which has been revised to Companies Act 
2016). If the breaches were against Listing Requirements, 
Bursa Malaysia is authorised to take actions against the 
perpetrator. The enforcement actions include warning, 
caution, reminder, reprimand (private and public) as well 
as delisting depending on the types and severity of the 
breaches. All enforcement actions are done privately by 
Bursa except for public reprimand and delisting. Hence, 
the public will not know whether the company is subjected 
to any enforcement actions except for when it is being 
publicly reprimanded or delisted. Delisting can be seen 
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as the ultimate action taken against companies found to 
violate the Listing Requirements. Public reprimand is an 
official warning issued to companies and this warning 
is made known to the public through media disclosure. 
Most often reprimand comes together with monetary fines. 
Market may react to enforcement actions that are made 
public, for example through share price. There is evidence 
that the share prices of the reprimanded companies are 
found to drop due to the public reprimand (for example, 
Kwan & Kwan 2011). Preliminary data collected for this 
study shows that from 141 companies being publicly 
reprimanded between the years of 2007 to 2011, 80 of them, 
or 57% got delisted. One of the reasons for enforcement 
action to be taken as stated by Bursa Malaysia is to deter 
future breaches, in other words as educating mechanism 
so that listed companies will not violate any of the Listing 
Requirements in the future. 
 The fact that more than half of reprimanded companies 
were being delisted led us to question whether public 
reprimand served as educating mechanism to listed 
companies. Studies on public reprimand are rather limited 
compared to other matters relating to capital market such 
as issues related to disclosure and firm values. Kwan and 
Kwan (2011) for example investigate the effect of public 
reprimand on share price, confirming prior findings by 
Chen, Firth, Gao and Rui (2005). Prior studies also identify 
factors such as visibility of the company (Kedia & Rajgopal 
2011), ownership structure (Chen, Jiang, Liang & Wang 
2011) as well as restatement (Files 2012) are related to 
public reprimand. Board of directors plays important role 
in ensuring that company is operating within the rules 
and regulations stipulated by authority. Studies on the 
relationship between enforcement actions and corporate 
governance are however limited. Romano and Guerrini 
(2012) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) are among the 
limited studies on this subject matter. The importance of 
corporate governance in ensuring good management of 
companies cannot be stressed enough. As stated by the 
chairman of Bursa Malaysia, “When companies are well 
governed, they are better able to attract capital investment 
and raise the standing of the capital market as a whole” 
(Towards Boardroom Excellence: Corporate Governance 
Guide 2nd edition, page 1). 
 In light of scarcity of studies that look into the link 
between corporate governance and enforcement actions, 
this study investigates whether board characteristics can 
be associated with enforcement actions, in the form of 
public reprimand. This study intends to provide further 
evidence on the relationship between enforcement actions 
and corporate governance in different setting. There are 
studies on the same issue in South Africa (Mangena & 
Chamisa 2008), Italy (Romano & Guerrini 2012) but none 
found using Malaysian setting. Another important objective 
of this study is to extend current knowledge on the role of 
public reprimand in educating companies to comply with 
the rules and regulations set by relevant authority. This 
study investigates whether public reprimand can trigger 
changes in the characteristics of the board to enable it to 
perform better and avoid violations in the future. Findings 
from this study will add to current knowledge on the role 
of authority in enforcing rules and regulations because 
rules regarding capital market are country specific. In 
addition, the findings will also provide insight into whether 
or not the enforcement actions by authority can educate 
companies into complying to the prescribed rules. The 
paper is structured as follows; this introduction section is 
followed with discussion on literature and hypotheses of 
the study. Next section discusses on methodology followed 
by results and discussion and ends with conclusion section.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The responsibility for the governance of the company 
effectively rests with the board of directors because they are 
the backbone that determines the direction of the company 
(Rezaee 2005). The role of the board of directors is not only 
to ensure that the management performs to the benefit of 
the company and shareholders, but the most basic function 
is to ensure that the company comply with the rules and 
requirements set by the authorities. In this study, the board 
of directors is seen as an agent that assists in protecting the 
interests of investors as a principal through their continuous 
monitoring of the company’s management. According 
to Nicholson and Kiel (2007), board members have the 
knowledge and expertise in the company’s operations that 
enable them to monitor management activities that may 
affect the interests of investors. The board also needs to 
maintain that the company complies with all rules set by 
Bursa Malaysia and ensures that financial information 
channelled to the investor are reliable. One factor that may 
contributes to the effective monitoring is the composition 
and structure of the board of directors. Nicholson and 
Kiel (2007) find that effective composition and structure 
of board of directors prevents the company from violating 
rules. Every capital market in the world has its own 
regulatory body. In Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia Berhad is 
entrusted with the operation and management of Malaysia’s 
stock exchange, known as Bursa Malaysia. Every single 
company listed in Bursa Malaysia is subjected to Listing 
Requirements. Failure to abide by this requirement will 
results in companies being subjected to enforcement 
actions, from fine to delisting. Previous studies have shown 
that tendency to comply with the rules is higher when 
there is rigorous enforcement in place. A study by Yeoh 
(2005) on the compliance behavior of listed companies 
in New Zealand indicates that the level of compliance 
with the Listing Requirements of the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange (NZX) is higher than compliance with Statements 
of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) and International 
Financial Reporting Standards (FRS). Yeoh (2005) argues 
that this may be due to the more stringent monitoring and 
enforcement by NZX. Gao and Kling (2012) made similar 
conclusion with listed companies in China. They found 
that the external audit opinion can improve compliance 
for mandatory disclosure requirements. In addition, the 
company’s internal and external governance environment 
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are also found to affect the company’s compliance with 
disclosure requirements.
 In reference to the case of Enron, Gillan and Martin 
(2007) stated that the reason for Enron’s failure is not just 
due to its weak corporate governance mechanisms but also 
due to the federal agency’s failure in its monitoring role. 
They stated that if the deficiencies in corporate governance 
were addressed early, Enron’s troubles could have been 
resolved. Gillan and Martin (2007) argued that Enron 
could have continue to operate given some changes to its 
governance structure such as increase in the independence 
of the board, stronger internal control system and limit 
the role of external auditors. It is therefore the role of the 
authority to protect the integrity of capital market through 
enforcement actions. The companies on the other hand are 
responsible to abide by the stipulated rules and regulations, 
and it is the duty of the board to ensure that this happen. 
Bursa Malaysia has even come out with “Corporate 
Governance Guide” to assist members of the board of 
directors in understanding and performing their duties 
as board members. The board however, cannot by itself 
monitor financial transactions and maintain accounting 
records. But, it is the duty of the board to establish an 
effective audit committee to overlook the matters relating 
to financial transactions and corporate reporting. Hence, 
in looking at compliance issue, the board as a whole and 
audit committee in specific are the responsible parties.
 This study investigates whether public reprimand can 
be associated with the internal governance mechanism. The 
most common measure used is the board characteristics. 
The characteristics that will be tested are the size of 
the board, the board independence, the duality role 
of chairman of the board and the frequency of board 
meeting. This study will also look at the audit committee 
characteristics on the basis that while the board as  a 
whole look at the strategic matter of the company, audit 
committee is directly responsible for financial reporting 
process, the audit process, the system of internal controls 
and compliance with laws and regulations. There are 
therefore two main hypotheses on the association between 
board characteristics and public reprimand, one being the 
characteristics of the board of directors as a whole and 
another one on the characteristics of audit committee. The 
following sub-sections discuss board characteristic and its 
relationship to public reprimand.
SIZE OF THE BOARD AND PUBLIC REPRIMAND
Bursa Malaysia does not prescribe the optimal size of 
the board of directors. According to MCCG (2007), board 
should examine its size, with a view of determining the 
impact of the number upon its effectiveness. Beiner, 
Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2004) argue that 
the optimal size of board of directors is seven or eight 
members. The size of the board that is smaller than the 
optimal size is said to reduce the ability of the board 
to manage and, conversely, a larger size may reduce 
the effective functioning of the board of directors as a 
decision maker. Adams and Ferreira (2008), Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) and Epps and Ismail (2009) argue that 
smaller board size enables the members to maintain 
control through discussion, exchange of information and 
setting objectives more effectively. On the other hand, 
Lamberto and Rath (2010) stated that it is better to have 
more members in the board of directors. This is because the 
tasks or responsibilities of the board can be spread out more 
widely among members. This allows each director to focus 
on the areas of their respective duties. In short, findings 
from previous studies are inconclusive as to whether large 
or small board size is more effective in performing the 
monitoring role. The study by Beiner et al. (2004) found 
that large board size makes communication and control 
more difficult. Ineffective communication and lack of 
control may increase the probability of non-compliance 
and hence may lead to the company being subjected to 
enforcement actions. Based on the argument of Adam and 
Ferreira (2009), Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and Beiner et al. 
(2004), hypothesis one of this study is stated as follows:
H1a – Size of BOD is significant and positively related to 
public reprimand. 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND PUBLIC REPRIMAND
Board independence refers to proportion of directors 
who are not affiliated with the company or independent 
to the total directors on the board. Higher percentage 
of independent directors against total number of board 
members indicates higher board independence. Independent 
directors are seen as more professional, have a wider 
perspective and can be more open in ensuring that the 
management acts in the best interest of the company and 
its shareholders. According to agency theory, monitoring 
by independent directors can be more effective, fairer 
decisions being made, more transparent as well as more 
objective in views and opinions offered. MCCG (2007) 
indicates that one-third of the board is independent while 
MCCG (2012) stated that where the chairman of the board 
is not independent, the board must comprise a majority of 
independent directors. According to Bauer, Frijns, Otten 
and Tourani-Rad (2008), independent director is one of 
the criteria that can influence the accountability of the 
board of directors. Independent directors are also seen to 
increase transparency in the company and compliance with 
the requirements of higher disclosure (Chen & Jaggi 2000; 
Gul & Leung 2004). This statement was also supported by 
Chen et al. (2005), Mangena and Chamisa (2008), Lakshan 
and Wijekoon (2012), Romano and Guerrini (2012) and 
Hsu and Wu (2014) who found the independent directors is 
negatively related to the failure of the company, corporate 
misconduct and enforcement actions. In line with these 
findings, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H1b – Board independence is significant and negatively 
related to public reprimand.
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CEO DUALITY AND PUBLIC REPRIMAND
Chairman of the board of directors is responsible for 
ensuring the effectiveness of the board in protecting the 
interests of shareholders. The chief executive officer is 
responsible for the implementation of all policies and 
strategies that have been decided by the board of directors 
of the company. In the Malaysian context, the clarity of 
each function is necessary to ensure a balance of power and 
responsibility. Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, 
MCCG (2012) stated that the positions of chairman and 
chief executive officer must be held by two different 
individuals. In other words, MCCG (2012) does not allow 
duality functions of CEO for companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Prior to 2012, the duality role was still allowed 
for companies listed in Bursa Malaysia (MCCG 2007). 
Duality refers to the situation where the chief executive 
officer and chairman of the board of directors of a company 
are the same individual. Past studies indicate the need for 
separation of the chairman and chief executive officer in 
ensuring the effectiveness of the company’s operations 
(Faleye 2007; Cutting & Kouzmin 2000). The study by 
Lakshan and Wijekoon (2012) found that duality of CEO 
has a positive relationship with the company’s failure. 
This is due to the lack of effective monitoring by the board 
since the chairman is also the CEO of the company. A more 
recent study in Thailand by Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi 
(2013) also found that the market reaction to the company 
in Thailand enforcement action is less serious when there is 
separation between the chairman and CEO of the company. 
Based on the findings of previous studies, this study expects 
the following relationship:
H1c – CEO duality is significant and positively related to 
public reprimand. 
FREQUENCY OF BOARD MEETING AND PUBLIC REPRIMAND
Board of directors meeting is one of the platforms where the 
directors can exercise their monitoring role. MCCG (2007) 
as well as MCCG (2012) suggests for more frequent board 
meeting to discuss current issues that require the attention 
of the board members. Frequency of meetings as well as 
the attendees must be disclosed in the annual reports, and 
used as one of the measures of board activities in a fiscal 
year (Kanagaretnam, Lobo & Whalen 2007). Number of 
meetings may be higher for companies with more complex 
activities or companies that are experiencing problems. 
Chen et al. (2005) provides evidence that the frequency 
of board meetings is positively related to corporate 
misconduct. This is because the board need to meet in 
order to address the issues that occur. Jackling and Johl 
(2009) as well as Brick and Chidambaram (2010) however 
found the relationship between frequency of meetings and 
company’s performance not significant. In line with Ummi 
Junaida and Rashidah (2011), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) 
and Chen et al. (2005), this study predicts that boards 
will meet more frequently when companies are subject 
to enforcement in order to discuss the issues as well as 
monitoring the management more closely. Accordingly, 
the next hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1d – Frequency of board meeting is significant and 
positively related to public reprimand.
AUDIT COMMITTEE AND PUBLIC REPRIMAND
According to DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and 
Reed (2002), audit committee that is made up of individuals 
who are qualified is more able to protect stakeholders with 
respect to ensuring that financial reporting is reliable as 
well as implementing effective system of internal control 
and risk management through continuous monitoring of the 
management. One important aspect of an effective audit 
committee is that it composed of expert and independent 
members. MCCG (2007) recommends every listed 
company to establish an audit committee consisting of at 
least three members, majority of which are independent. 
All members must also be non-executive directors, and 
audit committee must have at least one member who is a 
qualified accountant. Listing Requirements also stipulate 
that audit committee consists of at least one member who 
is registered with the professional accounting bodies to 
enable the committee to carry out its responsibilities more 
effectively and efficiently. Knowledge and experience 
in accounting, finance and auditing can help committee 
members in ensuring that companies comply with rules 
and regulations (Nor Haiza, Takiah & Norman 2006). 
Abbot, Parker and Peters (2004) provides evidence that 
independent audit committee with expert members in 
the field of accounting and finance is negatively related 
to the restatement of the company. Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005) supports Abbot et al.’s (2004) findings and reports 
a negative relationship between expertises of the audit 
committee with restatement. This means that audit 
committee with expert members can perform monitoring 
activities more effectively. 
 Apart from expertise and the independence of audit 
committee, the frequency of meetings also plays an 
important role in ensuring effective monitoring of the 
management. As with the board of directors, committee 
meeting can be a suitable platform for discussion of 
strategic issues faced by the company (Al-Najjar 2011). 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007) found that audit committee 
of companies with weak internal control systems meet 
more regularly to address these weaknesses. Based on 
the above discussions on the expertise and independence 
of audit committee as well as the frequency of meetings 
among members of the audit committee, the following 
hypotheses are developed:
H2a – Audit committee independence is significant and negatively related to public reprimand. 
H2b – Audit committee expertise is significant and negatively related to public reprimand.
H2c – Frequency of audit committee meeting is significant 
and positively related to public reprimand.
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PUBLIC REPRIMAND AS EDUCATING MECHANISM
Findings by Zubcic and Sims (2011) indicate that 
compliance by companies improves after enforcement 
actions were taken against them. This could be due to 
increase monitoring by board of directors. This finding 
partly shows that actions taken by the authority can serve as 
educating mechanism and triggers changes in companies’ 
corporate governance. According to Agrawal, Jaffe dan 
Karpoff (1999), enforcement actions can lead to reduction 
in companies’ values due to the possibility of having to 
incur legal costs. Hence, changes within the company is 
seen as a necessary and logical response. However, the 
study by Agrawal et al. (1999) fails to provide evidence 
of significant changes after the enforcement actions.  They 
conclude that the change do not happen perhaps due to 
costs factors, or the misconduct is related to the weakness 
of the internal control system and not the corporate 
governance structure itself. 
 Zubcic and Sims (2011) however, is of the opinion that 
enforcement actions should be able to alter the behavior 
of the perpetrator. This is because enforcement actions 
should have made the company realised the importance 
of complying with rules and regulations (Gunningham 
& Kangan 2005). In short, all this researches are of the 
opinion that enforcement actions should have serve as 
educating mechanism. 
 In another study, Ferris, Jandik, Lawless and Makhija 
(2007) found that the structure of board of directors does 
improved after companies are subjected to legal actions. In 
line with findings by Ferris et al. (2007), public reprimand 
is expected to initiate changes in the corporate governance 
practice of the companies and hence the following 
hypothesis is proposed:
H3 –  There are significant changes in the characteristics 
of the board of directors after the companies are 
subjected to public reprimand.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
This study uses purposive sampling technique where the 
sample is selected based on certain criteria that have been 
established to meet the needs of the research question 
(Bryman & Bell 2011). In this study, the criteria is a 
public company that is subjected to enforcement actions 
by Bursa Malaysia for committing a breach of its Listing 
Requirements. The data of companies being subjected to 
public reprimand is obtained from Bursa Malaysia website. 
The population is public listed company on the Main Board 
of Bursa Malaysia from 2007 to 2011. For the period of 
2007 to 2011, the number of companies listed on the 
main board of Bursa Malaysia that are subjected to public 
reprimand is 141 companies. During this period, a total of 
80 companies were delisted for failing to meet the Listing 
Requirements. The Company is therefore excluded from 
the sample list as a third hypothesis requires comparisons 
to be made between pre and post public reprimand, hence 
the company need to exist through the period of study. 
A total of six companies do not have other required data 
and hence removed from the sample list. This makes the 
final sample of 55 companies. This 55 companies that 
are subjected to public reprimand is then matched with 
companies of similar size and in the same industry during 
the same period but are not subjected to public reprimand. 
This is known as match-pair method. The total number of 
companies included in the analysis of hypotheses one and 
two are therefore 110 companies. 
 Data on independent variables is collected manually 
from annual report of these companies. The required data 
are size of the board of directors, board independence, 
duality role of CEO and frequency of board meeting to test 
hypothesis one. Testing of hypothesis two requires data 
on independence of audit committee, audit committee 
expertise and frequency of audit committee meeting. 
The size of the board is an absolute number. The board 
independence is measured by percentage of independent 
members compared to total number of board members. 
The duality of CEO is a dichotomous variable, ‘1’ given 
to companies that practice duality and ‘0’ to companies 
that do not practice duality. Frequency of board meeting 
is also an absolute number. Similar measures are used for 
second hypothesis on audit committee. Audit committee 
independence is measured from the percentage of 
independent audit members to total number of audit 
committee members. Expertise is also taken as percentage 
of audit committee members with accounting qualification 
to total numbers of audit committee members. 
 The dependent variable for hypotheses one and two 
is public reprimand. This is a categorical variable where 
companies subjected to public reprimand is given ‘1’ and 
those not subjected to public reprimand labelled as ‘0’. 
Because the independent variable is categorical, normal 
multiple regression cannot be performed but logistic 
regression is applied instead. Variables that are found 
to influence public reprimand by previous studies are 
included in the regression as control variables. These are 
size of the company and leverage. Size is measured by log 
of total asset and percentage of total debt to total assets 
is used to measure leverage. To ensure the findings are 
robust, additional test using ANOVA is used. The results 
are discussed in section 4.
 The regression model to test hypotheses one and two 
is as follows:
 PR =  β0 + β1Size + β2Ind_Board + β3Duality + 
β4BoardMeet  + β5Ind_AC + β6ExpertAC + 
β7ACMeet  + β8Size_Co + β9Lev + Ɛ
Where;
 PR = Public reprimand where ‘1’ is given to 
companies subjected to public reprimand 
and ‘0’ to companies which are not
 Size_Board =  Size of the board
 Ind_Board =  Percentage of independent board members 
to total number of board members
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 Duality =  Categorical variable with ‘1’ given to 
companies that practices duality and ‘0’ 
otherwise
 BoardMeet =  Frequency of board meetings
 Ind_AC =  Percentage of independent audit 
committee members to total number of 
audit committee members
 Expert_AC    =  Percentage of expert members to total 
number of audit committee members 
 AC Meet =  Frequency of audit committee meetings
 Size_Co = Log total assets
 Lev =  Total debt to total assets 
 Hypothesis three is tested using repeated measure 
t-test. T-test is used to determine whether there is 
statistically significant difference between the two sets of 
data. The second objective of this study is to test whether 
public reprimand serves as educating mechanism and 
triggers changes in the board characteristics. Hence it 
involves repeated tests on the same set of sample at two 
different points in time, pre and post enforcement actions. 
Hence, in order to see whether there are changes, the t-test 
for repeated measures is appropriate (Pallant 2010). Results 
are discussed in the following section. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Hypotheses one and two are tested using logistic regression 
as discussed in section 3. Before the regression is 
performed, the normal procedure on checking the data is 
performed including descriptive statistics and correlation 
analysis. Table 1 presents sample observations consists of 
companies subjected to public reprimand between year 
2007 and 2011 by industry.
 As can be seen, majority of the sample is from the 
trading and services companies followed by industrial 
goods. The details of breach to Listing Requirements by the 
companies included as our sample is presented in Table 2.
 Some companies are reprimanded for breaching more 
than one Listing Requirements. This explains the total 
number of companies that comes to 74 whereas our sample 
is only made of 55 companies. The reprimanded companies 
are then matched with similar size companies that are not 
subjected to public reprimand from the same industry. 
Descriptive analysis is performed to primarily check on 
the normality of data as well as checking on extreme data 
points. The results of descriptive analysis is presented in 
Table 3.
 As indicated in Table 3, based on the values of 
skewness and kurtosis, there is no serious issues of 
normality. The means of each characteristics tested also 
shows a slight difference between companies subjected 
to public reprimand and those that are not. Binomial 
relationship can be gauged from correlation analysis, and 
is presented in Table 4.
 Besides indicating binomial relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variable, correlation 
analysis can also be used as an early detection of 
multicollinearity. Pallant (2010) suggests that correlation 
value of less than 0.8 indicates no serious issue of 
multicollinearity. As can be seen in Table 4, multicollinearity 
is not a major concern in this case, except for the variables 
frequency of board meeting (BoardMeet) and audit 
committee meeting (ACMeet). As indicated in Table 4, 
the correlation value of these two variables is 0.8, hence 
raising concern on the possibility that the two variables 
are measuring the same thing. The high correlation in 
this case does not indicate that the two variables are 
measuring the same thing because audit committee and 
board members constitute of different group of people. This 
brings us to conclude that there is no major issue regarding 
multicollinearity and proceed with hypotheses testing 
(Gujarati & Porter 2010). The tests on hypotheses are hence 
performed and the results are presented in Table 5.
 As presented in Table 5, some of the hypotheses are 
supported. Results on the tests of hypothesis one on board 
characteristics show that board independence and frequency 
of board meetings are positive and significantly associated 
with public reprimand. The result on BoardMeet supports 
H1d and confirms earlier findings by Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2007) and Chen et al. (2005). The findings indicate that 
in Malaysia, the board of companies that are subjected to 
reprimand meet more often compared to those that are not 
subjected to reprimand, implying that board meets more 
often when there is problem to be handled. The results 
on board independence (Ind-Board) although significant 
is however not in the predicted direction, and hence H1b 
is not supported. The positive coefficient indicates that 
TABLE 1. Sample statistic according to industry
Industry Number of companies Percentage
Consumer goods
Trading and services
Construction
Industrial goods
Property
Infrastructure project companies
Finance
Technology
Total number of companies 
3 
20 
9 
12 
7 
1 
1 
2 
55 
5.5%
36.4%
16.4%
21.8%
12.7%
1.8%
1.8%
3.6%
100%
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TABLE 2. Types of breach on Listing Requirements 
Sub-paragraph Details of the breach Number of companies 
from the sample
P2.19 Failure to comply with instructions issued by Bursa Malaysia. 2
P8.27(1) Failure to ensure that all notices convening general meetings contain sufficient information 
to enable a member to decide whether to attend the meeting. 
1
P9.03(1) Failure to make immediate public disclosure of any material information. 6
P9.16(1)(a) Failure to ensure that each announcement is factual, clear, unambiguous, accurate, succinct 
and contains sufficient information
to enable investors to make informed investment decisions. 
30
P9.16(1)(c) Failure to ensure that each announcement is balanced and fair and avoid, among others, the 
omission of material facts. 
1
P9.19(19) Failure to immediately announce to the Exchange the winding-up order made against the 
listed issuer or any of its subsidiaries or major associated companies.
1
P9.19(24) Failure to immediately announce to the Exchange any disposal of shares in another corporation 
or any other event which results in such corporation ceasing to be a subsidiary of the listed 
issuer. 
1
P9.19(34) Failure to immediately announce to the Exchange any deviation of 10% or more between 
the profit after tax and minority interest stated in a financial estimate, forecast or projection 
previously announced or disclosed in a public document and the announced financial 
statements, giving an explanation of the deviation and the reconciliation of the deviation. 
2
P9.19(35) Failure to immediately announce to the Exchange any deviation of 10% or more between 
the profit or loss after tax and minority interest stated in the announced unaudited financial 
statements and the audited financial statements, giving an explanation of the deviation and 
the reconciliation of the deviation. 
1
P9.19(45) Failure to immediately announce to the Exchange any pending litigation or occurrence of 
circumstances of a material nature in which the listed issuer being a mining, plantation or 
timber corporation or any of its subsidiaries may be involved which may affect its income 
derived from title to or possession of any of its properties, licences or concessions from 
governmental authorities. 
1
P9.21 Failure to ensure all announcements made to the Exchange pursuant to these Requirements 
are published on the company’s website, as soon as practicable after the same are released 
on the Exchange’s website.
1
P9.22(1) Failure to announce to the Exchange, an interim financial report that is prepared on a quarterly 
basis (“quarterly report”), as soon as the figures have been approved by the board of directors 
of the listed issuer, and in any event not later than 2 months after the end of each quarter of 
a financial year. 
7
P9.23 Failure to issue company’s annual report that includes annual audited financial statements 
together with the auditors’ and directors’ reports of the listed issuer, to the Exchange and 
shareholders within 4 months from the close of the financial year of the listed issuer. 
12
P10.04(1) Failure to ensure that a valuation is conducted where a transaction involves an acquisition or 
disposal of any real estate or any corporation which owns real estate. 
2
P10.08(1) Failure to announce the related party transaction to the Exchange where any one of the 
percentage ratios of a related party transaction is 0.25% or more. 
1
P10.08(2)(c) Failure to appoint an independent adviser who is a corporate finance adviser within the meaning 
of the SC’s Principal Adviser Guidelines, before the terms of the transaction are agreed upon 
where the percentage ratios of a related party transaction is 5% or more. 
1
P10.08(4) Failure to appoint a main adviser, who is a Principal Adviser where the percentage ratios of 
a related party transaction is 25% or more other than a Recurrent
Related Party Transaction. 
1
P15.09(1) Failure to appoint an audit committee from amongst its directors composed of not fewer than 3 
members, non-executive directors, with a majority of them being independent directors; and at 
least one member of the audit committee is a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 
or have at least 3 years’ working experience and passed the examinations specified in Part I 
of the First Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967, or a member of one of the associations of 
accountants specified in Part II of the First Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967.  
1
P16.11 Failure to comply with all Listing Requirements subject to consultation with the SC led to 
de-listing of the company.
2
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the companies that are subjected to public reprimand 
has higher board independence compared to companies 
that are not subjected to public reprimand. In Malaysia, 
studies on the relationship between board independence 
and failure of the company (Shamsul Nahar 2006), the 
company’s performance (Nazli Anum 2010) and the delay 
in the audit report (Umi Junaidda & Rashidah 2011) found 
no significant relationship. In this respect the independent 
board members in Malaysia may have less influence in 
the company. The independent directors may also be less 
familiar with the operation of the company, hence less 
effective in the performing their tasks. The size of the board 
and duality are on the other hand do not show significant 
relationships to public reprimand, hence H1a and H1c are 
also not supported.
 Table 5 also presents results on hypotheses 2 regarding 
the characteristics of audit committee. The results show 
that H2a on audit committee independence and H2c on the 
frequency of audit committee meeting are significant 
while H2b on audit committee expertise is not supported. 
The results are basically consistent with previous research 
on similar issues such as Nor Haiza et al. (2006) on audit 
committee independence and Zhang et al. (2007) on the 
frequency of audit committee meeting. 
TABLE 3.Descriptive statistics
Variables Minimum
Value
Maximum 
value
Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Companies subjected to public reprimand
Size Board
Ind_Board
BoardMeet
Ind_AC
Expert_AC
ACMeet
Size_Co
Lev
4.00
0.25
2.00
0.50
0.00
2.00
4.24
0.19
13.00
0.83
23.00
1.00
1.00
16.00
6.98
2.38
7.509
0.468
6.582
0.855
0.347
5.809
5.491
0.618
1.770
0.132
3.924
0.156
0.147
2.474
0.557
0.304
0.536
0.752
3.051
-0.241
1.961
2.838
0.591
2.508
0.175
0.330
9.850
-1.717
7.155
8.864
0.181
11.105
Companies not subjected to public reprimand
Size Board
Ind_Board
BoardMeet
Ind_AC
Expert_AC
ACMeet
Size_Co
Lev
5.00
0.22
2.00
0.60
0.00
1.00
4.54
0.05
13.00
0.60
10.00
1.00
1.00
10.00
6.77
0.84
7.518
0.410
4.773
0.838
0.355
4.555
5.463
0.432
1.861
0.886
1.457
0.157
0.167
1.777
0.511
0.194
1.132
0.373
1.366
0.008
1.841
0.416
0.664
0.294
1.598
-0.280
3.347
-1.913
5.470
4.587
0.082
-0.995
Duality role Frequency Percentage
Companies subjected to public reprimand 11 20%
Companies not subjected to public reprimand 7 13%
TABLE 4.Correlation analysis
PR Size_Board Ind_Board Duality BoardMeet Ind_AC Expert_AC ACMeet Size_Co Lev
PR 1.000
Size_Board -0.003 1.000
Ind_Board 0.252** -0.328** 1.000
Duality 0.098 -0.248** 0.150* 1.000
BoardMeet 0.293** 0.080 0.162* -0.002 1.000
Ind_AC 0.054 0.058 0.334** 0.058 0.200** 1.000
Expert_AC -0.027 -0.156* 0.049 0.129 0.093 0.114 1.000
ACMeet 0.309** 0.084 0.071 0.051 0.800** 0.191** 0.008 1.000
Size_Co 0.026 0.341** -0.116 -0.037 0.002 -0.044 -0.012 0.086 1.000
Lev 0.343** -0.047 0.074 0.175** 0.349** 0.030 0.046 0.332** 0.140* 1.000
Note: ** Significant at 1%
 * Significant at 5%
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 Hypothesis three is tested using repeated measures 
t-test. This is to see if there is any changes in the board 
characteristic for the company that are subjected to public 
reprimand two years after being reprimanded. The results 
of the test is presented in Table 6.
 As can be seen from Table 6, the only variable that 
is significantly different is frequency of audit committee 
meetings. Expectedly, the frequency of meeting is less after 
the reprimand indicating that the committee meets more 
often in order to solve the issues. In general, the results 
do not support the contention that enforcement actions by 
authority serves as educating mechanism. The relevant 
authority may have to consider the types of action that 
can act as educating mechanism as oppose to punishment 
mechanism, so that companies can be self-regulating in 
the long-run.
CONCLUSION
The results indicate that there are certain differences in the 
characteristics of the board as well as the audit committee 
between companies that are subjected to public reprimand 
and those that are not. In specific, the results indicate that 
board members as well as audit committee members meet 
more frequently when there are issues or problems to be 
resolved. The Listing Requirements do not prescribed the 
optimal number of meetings that the board should have but 
the company should clearly disclose the frequency of the 
meeting. From the studied sample, the average meetings is 
about four times per year. The meeting frequency for the 
reprimanded companies goes down from 6 meetings on 
average in the year of reprimand to 4 meetings on average 
two years after being reprimanded. This enhances the 
contention that board meets more frequently when there is 
problems to be tackled. The same goes for audit committee. 
This partially proves that corporate governance mechanism 
is an important feature in ensuring that companies are 
governed in the best interest of the shareholders. However, 
it also raise questions on what is the real function of the 
board. Should not the board monitor the management and 
prevent the company from being subjected to enforcement 
actions? The board is supposed to set direction and strategy 
for the company and making sure that shareholders wealth 
are maximized. The venue in which this can be done is 
the board meeting. Future study can investigate into the 
optimal number of board meeting in relation to company’s 
performance. 
 The second objective of this study is to investigate 
whether enforcement actions by the authority can be 
taken as educating mechanism. In other words, can public 
reprimand by Bursa Malaysia be taken as a trigger that 
encourage the companies to change especially in their 
corporate governance structure. The results however do 
not support this contention. The findings show that there 
TABLE 5. Logistic regression analysis
Independent variables Coefficients Std Dev Wald Value Sig. p
Size_Board
Ind_Board
Duality
BoardMeet
Ind_AC
Expert_AC
ACMeet
Size_Co
Lev
0.173
6.981
0.133
0.233
-2.002
-0.737
0.388
-0.422
3.177
0.107
1.824
0.465
0.128
1.134
1.078
0.176
0.344
0.895
2.637
14.641
0.082
3.327
3.119
0.468
4.879
1.502
12.602
0.104
0.000*
0.775
0.068**
0.077**
0.494
0.027*
0.220
0.000*
Note : * Significant at 5%
 ** Significant at 10%
 Nagelkerke value R2  = 0.367
 Correct prediction value = 73%.
TABLE 6. Comparison of board characteristics pre and post public reprimand
Independent 
variables
Panel A 
(Pre)
Panel B 
(Post) Mean difference df t
Sig.
(2-tailed)*Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Size_Board
Ind_Board
Duality
BoardMeet
Ind_AC
Expert_AC
ACMeet
7.527
0.486
0.200
6.527
0.886
0.360
5.945
1.884
0.147
0.404
3.863
0.156
0.184
2.391
7.164
0.475
0.182
6.655
0.896
0.383
5.182
1.761
0.120
0.389
3.262
0.151
0.171
1.553
0.364
0.012
0.018
-0.127
-0.011
-0.023
0.764
54
54
54
54
54
54
54
1.508
0.717
0.375
-0.191
-0.449
-1.368
2.046
0.137
0.476
0.709
0.849
0.655
0.177
0.046*
Note : * Significant at 5%
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are barely changes in the characteristics of the board and 
audit committee of the reprimanded companies two years 
after being reprimanded. This brings us to suggest that the 
authority revisit the form of enforcement action to be taken 
against companies that violate the rules and regulations set 
by the authority. 
 This study is however not without limitation. The 
period of two years taken as comparison may not be long 
enough to allow for ample changes to take place. Future 
study can look at longer comparison period. A more in-
depth case study can also be conducted on the repeated 
offenders in order to understand the reasons for violation 
and the failure to change accordingly. On the other hand, 
given the emphasize on good corporate governance 
practices by Malaysian authority especially Securities 
Commission of Malaysia, companies are basically already 
complying with the best practice code. This can explain the 
little changes in term of the structure found by this study. 
Further studies could focus on the potential changes in 
term of ethical or behavioural aspects of those governing 
the companies. 
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